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Abstract  
   This paper revisits the Institutions and growth models. Econometric techniques have been 
applied on cross-country data, just to confirm the apriori knowledge that Institutions effect 
on growth is positive and highly statistically significant. This evidence was confirmed by all 
four models. OLS proved as a better technique for our data than 2SLS, this simply because 
overidentification test showed that instrument cannot be considered exogenous, also 
Hausman test showed that OLS is better than 2SLS at 1% and 5% levels of significance. 
G2SLS estimator and Fixed effects panel estimators just confirmed the results from the OLS 
and 2SLS. As a proxy variable for institutions we used Rule of law variable, also as 
instruments were used revolutions and Freedom house rating as well as War casualties 
variables. Also as conclusion here Trade is insignificant in influence to GDP growth 
compared with quality of institutions.  
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Literature review of Institution and growth 
 
The growth theory tries to explain the dynamic of growth process and the enormous 
differences of income per capita and economic performance among countries. From historical 
perspective, some group of countries have accomplished very high rate of growth and 
economic performance compared with other countries which face with economic problems 
(slowly dynamic of growth process). There are many explanations about this fact, basically, 
three theories analyze the factors which determinate cross-country differences in income 
levels and growth rate. First, the neoclassical theory of economic growth, based on work of 
Solow (1956), Lucas (1988), and others, focuses on the inputs of physical and human capital 
as a main resource of growth process, and late, Romer (1990) focus on technology advances 
through R&D activities (activities that create new ideas in economy) as a engine of growth. 
Second, the geographic/location theory explain that the geographic location of country 
(access to market) and the climate condition are very important for income level and 
economic performance. The theoretical and empirical research present the strong causality 
between the geographic location and the income level, the geographic/location theory explain 
only the income level differences among countries. In other side, the most important question 
for economist is the engine of growth, and in this direction the growth theory tries to explain 
the factors which determent the rate of growth. Third, the institutional approach emphasizes 
the importance of creating an institutional environment and institutions that support and 
encourage the main foundation of market economy (e.g. protection of property rights, rule of 
law, enforcement of contracts, and voluntary exchange of market-determined price. 
Institutions refer to rules, regulations, laws and policies that affect economic incentives such 
as incentives to invest in technology, physical capital and human capital. In this regard, the 
good institution framework is necessary for high level investment. Investors do not prefer to 
risk their capital when the protection of property rights is poorly, there are weak in rule of 
law and enforcement of contracts, and other illegal activities in market foundation economy.    
The theoretical explanations for growth that we introduced above are not inconsistent each 
other and all might play important role, but institutions are the major fundamental cause of 
economic growth and cross-country differences in economic performance.   
The research of our paper focuses on the causality relationship between institutions and 
growth, and analyzes how quality of institutions influences growth rate. The empirical 
investigate show the more strong direction of causality of institutional quality to growth than 
the influence of growth to quality institutions. The explanation of this result is the fact that 
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poor counties have more incentive to improve the quality of their institutions to achieve 
higher growth rate, rather than develop counties with high growth do not need to improve the 
institutional environment because that countries already have reached high-quality 
institutions.   
  
Theoretical model of institutions, capital and economic growth  
 
To develop the growth model with institutions, we start our analysis with aggregate 
production function which describes how the inputs (physical and human capital, labor and 
technology) are combined to produce output.
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where Y is output, the parameter A represent the level of technology in economy, K is 
physical capital, H is human capital, and L is labor. We should make distinction between 
human capital and labor. The labor force is amount of people who are able to work, in the 
other side, human capital is the knowledge, skills and abilities of people who are or who may 
be involved in production process.     
 
The equation of production function can write in per capita form: 
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Traditional macroeconomic growth models do not include the influence of institutional 
quality as a factor of economic growth. These models implicitly assume an underlying set of 
good institutions. The fact that institutions have important role in growth process, the 
economists try to implement the institutional quality in growth models.   
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 The production function is characterize with constant return,  .1≤+ βα  
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where 0A represents the basic level of technology, 
*In represents the best quality institutions, 
these ideal institutions are assumed in the traditional growth model, and In is the country’s 
current level of institutional quality. The mathematical statement )( *InIn−  measures the 
degree to which the country’s institutions fall short of the best conditions. The traditional 
growth model assume that economies function close to best-quality institutions, *InIn= , 
thus, these growth model reduce the influence of quality institutions.  
 
Substituting the equation (3) into equation of production function per worker, we get: 
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Rewriting this equation we get: 
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To study the dynamic of output per capita, we will use a simple mathematical trick that 
economists often used in the study of growth.
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 The mathematical trick is to “take logs and 
then derivatives”. 
 
If we take logs of equation (6), we obtain: 
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Derivatives regarding time t, we obtain following form:  
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 Mathematical notes: The theory of growth uses some properties of natural logarithms. One of that properties is: 
The statement regarding the timing of the logarithms of a variable, gives the growth rate of that variable: 
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As we can see, the equation (8), show the growth rate of output per capita: 
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Rewriting equation (8) we get following form of growth rate of output per capita: 
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If we assume that: )( *11 Inδαϕ −= ; )(
*
22 Inδβϕ −= and 00 A∆=α , and adding an error term tε , 
we get final equation of growth rate of output per capita:                  
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The final basic equation that we got in our theoretical model can use to test the impact 
of institution on the growth by the influence of institution’s quality on the productivity of 
physical and human capital. In addition, we explain the coefficient estimates for   2121 ,,, δδϕϕ . 
The coefficient 1ϕ  and 2ϕ  measure the return to physical and human capital investments (the 
productivity of capital investments) in a country with the worst possible institutional quality, 
while coefficient 1δ  and 2δ  showing an increasing return to these capital investments as the 
country’s institutional quality improves to the ideal level for economy based of market 
foundations.  
 
Measuring problems with institutional quality and their influence of growth 
 
In our theoretical model of institutions, capital and growth we can see that some 
parameters are relatively easy to measure, for example, K is amount of physical capital and H 
                                                           
4
 Where symbol, ∆ , denotes changes of parameters. 
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is human capita that measure by years of schooling. On the other hand, institutions are not 
easily to quantifiable and this makes problem to measure the influence of institutions to 
economic growth. Economists try to solve the problem with measuring the quality of 
institutions by including some instrumental variables.  
First, we will define the range of institutions and put some variables to measure 
different aspects of institutional environment. Institutions are the rule of game and it 
encompasses different type of social arrangements, laws, regulation, enforcement of property 
rights and so on. This definition of institutions is very widely and we can learn relatively little 
by emphasizing the importance of such a broad set of institutions. It is therefore important to 
try to understand what types of institutions are more important for economic growth. This is 
very useful for our empirical analysis of institutions and economic growth. There three type 
of institutions: political, financial and economic institutions. The quality of each of these type 
of institutions are measured through different variables. For example, the main variables for 
political institutions are: political rights and civil liberties that contain the political freedom 
index, rule of law that contain rule of law index, control of corruption and corruption freedom 
that contain index of corruption and other variables. On the other hand, the main variables of 
economic institutions are: protection of property rights, regulation and business freedom 
index that refer to trade freedom, freedom in doing business, financial freedom, investment 
freedom, and quality of regulation system.  
The investigation of relative roles of different types of institutions is very important 
because as we can see above different type of institution have different influence of growth 
and economic performance. The economic institutions have the major role for growth, and in 
this regard when economist testified the relationship between institutions and growth, have to 
measure variables that cause quality of economic institutions more that quality of political 
institutions. 
 
Data and the methodology  
 
  Data are from 212 groups of countries and geographic regions. These cross-country data 
were used in more than one study, including those from Dollar and Kraay (2003). In our 
study we are going to test the influence of institutions on average GDP growth per capita at 
PPP. The other variables are: 
Rulellaw-law and order rating, we use this variable as proxy for quality of institutions, this 
variables is expected to be positively correlated with the average growth of GDP per capita.  
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Wardead-war casualties, frehouserating-freedom house rating, cima_v-contractintensive 
money (measure of property rights), revolution-revolutions, these variables are proxies for 
rulellaw. These variables are being used as instruments for rule of law variable and are 
proxies for quality of institutions. 
 
gdppercap~a-average GDP per capita growth at PPP. This variable is variable of interest in 
our study. Dependent variable is being expressed in per capita terms and PPP conversion 
factor for more comparable result has been added. This variable is expressed in log terms. 
govconshar~p-government consumption as share of GDP. This variable is expected to be 
positively correlated with average GDP per capita growth variable. This variable is expressed 
in log terms. 
fdiinflow_~p-FDI inflows as percentage to GDP. 
linvestmen~p-log of investment as fraction to GDP 
lnbmp-this variable is log of (1+black market premium). Black market premium refers to the 
amount in excess of the official exchange rate that must be paid to purchase foreign exchange 
on an illegal ("black") market. Black market premium when the official rate is not market 
clearing is presented on the next graph. The premium typically arises when a country fixes 
the value of its exchange rate in relation to another currency irrespective of the rate that 
would prevail in the commercial market. It is akin to the authorities’ fixing a price for a 
commodity at a non-market-clearing level.  
 
 
  
In figure 1, schedule DD reflects demand for foreign exchange, while schedule SS reflects the 
supply. Under normal circumstances DD will be downward sloping, meaning that demand for 
foreign exchange will be greater as the price (in units of domestic currency) declines. 
Similarly, SS will slope upward, since additional foreign currency will be supplied to the 
market only as the price (in units of local currency per unit of foreign currency) increases. 
Provided normal economic conditions prevail, the market can be expected to clear at price 
P*, where the supply and demand schedules intersect. At this price, quantity Q* of foreign 
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exchange will be bought and sold.  When a nation fixes its exchange rate at a nonmarket- 
clearing rate, the normalmarket mechanism is disrupted. At the official exchange rate, POFF, 
demand for foreign exchange, QDO, exceeds the available supply, QSO. Those wishing to 
purchase foreign exchange cannot obtain it at the official price in the commercial market. If 
they seek to obtain foreign exchange from a private source, rather than using the queuing 
mechanism established by the authorities, they will need to pay more than the official 
price.The margin will reflect the scarcity value of the foreign exchange, plus a premium to 
compensate sellers for participating in an illegal (‘‘black’’) market. This risk can be depicted 
by a leftward (upward) shift in the supply curve to S0S0, making the market-clearing 
exchange rate, PB, likely to exceed the clearing rate in a legal market. The difference 
between the clearing rate in the illegal market, PB, and the official exchange rate, POFF, is 
the black market premium. This variable it is expected to be negatively correlated wioth the 
average growth of GDP per capita.  
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) versus OLS  
 
An Instrumental Variable is a variable that is correlated with X but uncorrelated with e. 
If Zi is an instrumental variable: 
1. E( Zi Xi ) ≠ 0 
2. E( Zi ei ) = 0  
 The econometrician can use an instrumental variable Z to estimate the effect on Y of only 
that part of X that is correlated with Z. Because Z is uncorrelated with e, any part of X that is 
correlated with Z must also be uncorrelated with e. An instrumental variable lets the 
econometrician find a part of X that behaves as though it had been randomly assigned. When 
the economist is worried about measurement error, a good choice of instrument is simply a 
different measure of the same variable. The new measure may have its own errors, but these 
errors are unlikely to be correlated with the mistakes in the first measure, or with any other 
component of e (Murray, 2006). Instrumental variables are NOT the explanator of interest. 
We do not simply use instrumental variables as proxies for the explanator of interest.  
Instead, we use IV’s as a tool to tease out the “random” (or at least uncorrelated) component 
of X. Let’s construct a consistent IV estimator for the case of measurement error. 
 
1. iii XY εββ ++= 10  0)( =iE ε  
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If Xi were uncorrelated with ei , we  would want to weight more heavily observations with a 
high xi value. We know that Zi is correlated with the “clean” part of Xi , so now we want to 
weight more heavily observations with  a high zi value. Here we ask question what is 
expectation for IV? 
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Because 0),( ≠iiXCov ε , the bias term cannot be eliminated IV is biased in the same 
direction as the bias in OLS. 
A variable Zi can instrument for a particular troublesome explanator, XRi, if: 
Cov( Zi,XRi ) ≠ 0  
Cov( Zi,ei ) = 0  
Zi must be correlated with the troublesome variable for which it instruments, but need not be 
correlated with all of the troublesome variables. To estimate a multiple regression 
consistently, we need at least one instrumental variable for each troublesome explanator. 
When we have just enough instruments for consistent estimation, we say the regression 
equation is exactly identified. When we have more than enough instruments, the regression 
equation is over identified. When we do not have enough instruments, the equation is under 
identified (and inconsistent). An Instrumental Variable is a variable that is correlated with 
X but uncorrelated with e.  
If Zi is an instrumental variable: 
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E(ZiXi ) ≠ 0 
E(Ziei ) = 0  
If Xi were uncorrelated with ei , we  would want to weight more heavily observations with a 
high xi value.We know that Zi is correlated with the “clean” part of Xi , so now we want to 
weight more heavily observations with  a high zi value. 
 
Beta estimator is  
 
∑
∑=
ii
iiIV
xz
Yz
βˆ  
 
When the regression is under identified, then we do not have a consistent estimator. 
When the regression is exactly identified, then we simply use Instrumental Variables Least 
Squares. When the regression is over identified, we have more instruments than we need. The 
methods we learned last time are only suitable for the exactly identified case. When the 
regression equation is over identified, we have more instruments than we need. We could 
simply discard the additional instruments, but then we throw out valuable information. 
Ignoring valid instruments is inefficient. Standard OLS estimator is BLUE best linear 
unbiased estimator, to test whether OLS coefficients or 2SLS coefficients are better we are 
going to perform Hausman test. The Hausman specification test performs test of significance 
of one estimator versus alternative estimator 
 
Panel Fixed effects IV model versus Random effects IV model 
 
   Potential unobserved heterogeneity is a form of omitted variables bias.“Unobserved 
heterogeneity” refers to omitted variables that are fixed for an individual (at least over a long 
period of time). With cross-sectional data, there is no particular reason to differentiate 
between omitted variables that are fixed over time and omitted variables that are changing. 
However, when an omitted variable is fixed over time; panel data offers another tool for 
eliminating the bias. Panel Data is data in which we observe repeated cross-sections of the 
same individuals. Examples: 
– Annual unemployment rates of each state over several years 
– Quarterly sales of individual stores over  several quarters 
– Wages for the same worker, working at several different jobs 
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By far the leading type of panel data is repeated cross-sections over time. The key feature of 
panel data is that we observe the same individual in more than one condition. Omitted 
variables that are fixed will take on the same values each time we observe the same 
individual. The Fixed Effects Estimator basic idea is to estimate a separate intercept for each 
individual. 
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When we difference, the heterogeneity term vi drops out. (In the distinct intercepts model, the 
b0i would drop out). By assumption, the mit are uncorrelated with the Xit  OLS would be a 
consistent estimator of b1.  
When unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with explanators, panel data techniques are 
not needed to produce a consistent estimator. However, we do need to correct for serial 
correlation between observations of the same individual. When ,0),( =iit vXE  , panel data 
does not offer special benefits. We use Random Effects to overcome the serial correlation of 
panel data. The key idea of random effects: 
• Estimate sv
2
 and sm
2 
 
• Use these estimates to construct efficient weights of panel data 
observations 
 
Once we have estimates of sv
2
 and sm
2
, we can re-weight the observations optimally. 
These calculations are complicated, but most computer packages can implement them. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the model 
Descriptive statistics of the model is given in the following table  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
lgdppercap~a |       848    191.1038    184.5586          1        560 
    rulellaw |       848    5.643868    9.014775          1         31 
  lavertrade |       848    125.4929    150.5476          1        460 
govconshar~p |       848     150.888    166.4599          1        502 
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       lnbmp |       848    110.2618    132.5916          1        420 
linvestmen~p |       848    3.576252    2.632151          0   6.326149 
fdiinflow_~p |       848    125.5778    148.9089          1        458 
      cima_v |       848    145.7642    163.9984          1        496 
     wardead |       848    12.44458    28.41316          1        133 
  revolution |       848    4.548349     5.94604          1         30 
frehousera~g |       848    11.05896    13.34896          1         37 
 
 
In our sample we use decadal data. Sample contains 4 observations for each of 212 groups in 
the panel, contains data from 1969-1979,1979-1989, and 1989-1999. Moving of the variables 
through four decades is shown on the next graphs.  
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Where YIN here is annual average growth of GDP pre capita in PPP terms variable. Cimav 
are contract intensive money. Contract Intensive Money (CIM) = (M2 - money outside the 
banking system)/M2 where M2= Money + Quasi money. Proportion of money supply held by 
the banking system, sometimes interpreted as a proxy for the rule of law or an indicator of the 
credibility of financial institutions.LNOPENAV is natural logarithm of the average trade 
openness of the country, i.e. Average trade. RULELAWIN is the rule of law variable it law 
and order rating variable.  
 
2SLS VS OLS 
5
 
 
2SLS regression is modeled as follows: 
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 See Appendix 1 2SLS regression  
13 
 
 
iucontrolsTradensinstitutiotaGDPpercapi ++++= 3210)ln( ββββ  
 
Dependent variable log of GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Instrumental 
variables 
(2SLS) 
regression 
Variables  Coefficients p-value P>|t|      
  
rulellaw Rule of law proxy 
for quality of 
institutions  
11.45504 0.005 
lavertrade Log of average trade  -0.0905889 0.071 
lnbmp Log of black market 
premium 
-0.1623014 0.000 
linvestmen~p Log of investment 
as a fraction to GDP 
31.56 0.000 
govconshar~p Government 
consumption as a 
share to GDP 
0.1011464 0.114 
fdiinflow_~p FDI inflows as 
proportion to GDP 
0.126112 0.003 
_cons Constant term  11.75178 0.285 
Instrumented:  rulellaw 
 
Instruments:   lavertrade lnbmp linvestmentgdp govconsharegdp fdiinflow_gdp 
               frehouserating revolution cima_v 
 
 
From the above Table we can see that the rule of law is highly positively correlated with 
growth, coefficient is 11.45, p-value is 0.005, meaning that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at all conventional levels. This is expected positive sign from the theory. 
Coefficient on the logarithm of average trade is small of size (-0.09), but is statistically 
significant up to 7% level of significance. Growth is positively correlated with average trade, 
but trade compared with other explanatory variables here has negative sign, meaning that 
compared to the institutions is growth deteriorating. Logarithm of black market premium 
exerts negative sign, which is expected from the apriori knowledge. Black market is non-
regulated market that doesn’t pay taxes to the country in which exists coefficient is -0.16, and 
is significant at all conventional levels. Private investment and government consumption as a 
fraction to GDP are expectedly positively correlated with growth with coefficients of 31.56 
and 0.11 respectively. And Investment as a fraction to GDP is significant at all conventional 
levels, while government consumption is almost significant at 10% level of significance. FDI 
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are positively correlated with growth as it is expected from the theory with a sign 0.12. Here 
instruments for Rule of law are contract intensive money, war casualties and revolutions. 
OLS regression is presented in a Table 
6
 
 
Dependent variable log of GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Ordinary 
least squares 
regression 
Variables  Coefficients p-value P>|t|      
  
rulellaw Rule of law proxy 
for quality of 
institutions  
5.024089    0.000 
lavertrade Log of average trade  -0.0384768    0.268 
lnbmp Log of black market 
premium 
-0.1948633     0.000 
linvestmen~p Log of investment 
as a fraction to GDP 
33.33 0.000 
govconshar~p Government 
consumption as a 
share to GDP 
0.1868692    0.000 
fdiinflow_~p FDI inflows as 
proportion to GDP 
0.1501029     0.000 
_cons Constant term  22.83623    0.003 
 
Ramsey Reset test using powers of the fitted values of the dependent variable 
F(3, 838) =      1.78 
Prob > F =      0.1490 
 
 
 
From the above Table only the coefficient of trade is negative and insignificant at all 
conventional levels. Rule of law as a proxy for institutional quality is again as expected 
positively correlated with growth, coefficient of 5.02 and highly significant at all levels of 
significance. Black market premium is negative -0.19 and is significant at all conventional 
levels. Investment as fraction to GDP, government consumption as a share to GDP and FDI 
inflows as a fraction to GDP are positively correlated with growth. Coefficients respectively 
are: 33.33,0.18 and 0.15 and are significant at all conventional levels. Ramsey Reset test 
showed that the model does not suffer from omitted variables bias. If we reject the null 
hypothesis of no omitted variables , probability of making Type I error is 15%.  
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Hausman test  
 
   This command computes the Hausman test statistic. The null hypothesis is that the OLS 
estimator is consistent. If accepted, we probably would prefer to use OLS instead of 2SLS. 
The option constant is necessary to tell Stata to include the constant term in the comparison 
of both estimates. The sigmamore option tells Stata to use the same estimate of the variance 
of the error term for both models. This is desirable here since the error term has the same 
interpretation in both models. The df(1) option tells Stata that the null distribution has one 
degree of freedom. Stata was able to figure this out when I left this option out, even though 
the Hausman test is comparing values of two 5- element (not one-element) vectors. It 
probably knew this by finding only one non-zero eigenvalue of the 5-by-5 covariance matrix 
estimate that it calls (V_b-V_B) in the output. It’s safer to impose the d.f. in the hausman 
command as above. 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     ivreg          .          Difference          S.E. 
 
    rulellaw |    11.45504     5.024089         6.43095        3.736097 
  lavertrade |   -.0905889    -.0384768       -.0521121        .0302748 
       lnbmp |   -.1623014    -.1948633         .032562        .0189171 
linvestmen~p |       31.56     33.32564       -1.765634        1.025755 
govconshar~p |    .1011464     .1868692       -.0857229        .0498012 
fdiinflow_~p |     .126112     .1501029       -.0239909        .0139376 
       _cons |    11.75178     22.83623       -11.08445        6.439575 
 
          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress 
   Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
      chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        2.96 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0852 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
From the above result from Hausman test, we can see that OLS is acceptable at 1% and 5% 
level of significance, but not at 10% .Otherwise 2SLS squares would be more preferable.  
 
Over identification test
7
 
 
Next are presented results from the overidentification test.  
 
                                                           
7
 See Hausman test in Appendix 3  
 scalar list x
2
 pval 
        x
2
 =  474.82519 
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So at all conventional levels of significance we can drop hypothesis that instruments are 
exogenous. We can drop one or two of them but we can’t be sure if that solves the problem. 
 
 So in conclusion about this part we can say that OLS won the battle and is better estimator 
than OLS , since it has better results in Hausman test and 2SLS did not show good 
overidentification test. From the below scatters it is evident that Rule of law variable and 
openness variable are positively correlated with growth.  
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G2SLS random-effects (RE) model 
 
  IV estimation can also be combined with panel data models in a straight forward manner 
Recall, that under the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity we removed the unobserved 
heterogeneity by either first differencing or fixed effects. This left us back in the world of 
OLS. However, one of the demeaned or first-differenced repressors could still be correlated 
with the error term, suggesting that IV could be helpful. Ctry variable i.e. country is panel IIS 
, ID variable. 
8
 
 
 
                                                           
8
 See Appendix 4 G2SLS random-effects (RE) model 
 
      pval =          0 
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Dependent variable log of GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Instrumental 
variables 
(G2SLS) 
regression 
Random 
effects model  
Variables  Coefficients p-value P>|t|      
  
rulellaw Rule of law proxy 
for quality of 
institutions  
1.622535     0.000 
lavertrade Log of average trade  -0.0008549    0.981 
    
linvestmen~p Log of investment 
as a fraction to GDP 
     0.3291961    0.000 
govconshar~p Government 
consumption as a 
share to GDP 
0.1058485 0.011 
    
_cons Constant term  65.90368    0.000 
Group 
variable :ctry  
   
Instrumented:  rulellaw 
 
Instruments:   lavertrade investmentgdp govconsharegdp frehouserating wardead revolution 
                cima_v 
 
 
  From the above regression we can see that rulellaw variable which is being used as proxy 
for quality of institutions, is positively correlated with growth of GDP per capita variable at 
PPP terms, coefficient is 1.6 and p-value is 0.000. Coefficient on Trade is highly 
insignificant, pvalue is 0.981. Investment and government consumption are positively and 
statistically significant with coefficients 0.32 and 0.11 respectively.  
As conclusion Trade is insignificant to growth compared with institutions.  
 
Fixed effects regression (within)IV model
9
 
 
In the next Table is presented Fixed effects panel regression IV model with panel ID variable 
ctry. 
 
Dependent variable log of GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Fixed effects 
regression 
(within)IV 
Variables  Coefficients p-value P>|t|      
                                                           
9
 See Appendix 5 Fixed effects regression (within)IV model 
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model  
  
rulellaw Rule of law proxy 
for quality of 
institutions  
1.579087      0.000 
lavertrade Log of average trade  -0.020254    0.640 
    
linvestmen~p Log of investment 
as a fraction to GDP 
     0.2575612   0.000 
govconshar~p Government 
consumption as a 
share to GDP 
0.0961099 0.024 
    
_cons Constant term  84.53991    0.000 
Group 
variable :ctry  
   
 
 
 
 
In conclusion institutions and investment as fraction to GDP and government consumption as 
share to GDP are positively and statistically significantly correlated.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2SLS regression 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     848 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   841) =  124.71 
       Model |  13000377.3     6  2166729.55           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  15850017.6   841  18846.6321           R-squared     =  0.4506 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4467 
       Total |  28850394.9   847  34061.8593           Root MSE      =  137.28 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lgdppercap~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    rulellaw |   11.45504   4.102134     2.79   0.005     3.403417    19.50666 
  lavertrade |  -.0905889   .0500865    -1.81   0.071    -.1888982    .0077204 
       lnbmp |  -.1623014   .0445351    -3.64   0.000    -.2497144   -.0748884 
linvestmen~p |      31.56   2.686769    11.75   0.000     26.28644    36.83356 
govconshar~p |   .1011464   .0639289     1.58   0.114    -.0243325    .2266253 
fdiinflow_~p |    .126112   .0420451     3.00   0.003     .0435863    .2086377 
       _cons |   11.75178   10.98684     1.07   0.285    -9.813075    33.31663 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  rulellaw 
Instruments:   lavertrade lnbmp linvestmentgdp govconsharegdp fdiinflow_gdp 
               frehouserating revolution cima_v 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2 OLS regression  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     848 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   841) =  161.59 
       Model |  15449333.1     6  2574888.86           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  13401061.7   841  15934.6751           R-squared     =  0.5355 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5322 
       Total |  28850394.9   847  34061.8593           Root MSE      =  126.23 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lgdppercap~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    rulellaw |   5.024089   .5187478     9.69   0.000     4.005897    6.042282 
  lavertrade |  -.0384768   .0347058    -1.11   0.268    -.1065969    .0296433 
       lnbmp |  -.1948633    .036319    -5.37   0.000    -.2661499   -.1235767 
linvestmen~p |   33.32564   2.247488    14.83   0.000     28.91429    37.73698 
govconshar~p |   .1868692   .0312295     5.98   0.000     .1255722    .2481662 
fdiinflow_~p |   .1501029    .036061     4.16   0.000     .0793227     .220883 
       _cons |   22.83623   7.784074     2.93   0.003     7.557735    38.11472 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lgdppercapita 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 838) =      1.78 
                  Prob > F =      0.1490 
 
 
Appendix 3 Hausman test  
 
quietly reg  ivresid   ruleoflaw lavertrade investmentgdp  govconsharegdp 
 
. predict explresid,xb 
 
. matrix accum rssmat = explresid,noconstant 
(obs=848) 
 
 
. matrix accum rssmat = explresid,noconstant 
(obs=848) 
 
. matrix accum tssmat = ivresid,noconstant 
(obs=847) 
 
. scalar nobs=e(N) 
 
. scalar x2=nobs*rssmat[1,1]/tssmat[1,1] 
 
. scalar pval=1-chi2(1,x2) 
 
. scalar list x2 pval 
        x2 =  474.82519 
      pval =          0 
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Appendix 4 G2SLS random effects IV regression  
 
G2SLS random-effects IV regression              Number of obs      =       848 
Group variable: ctry                            Number of groups   =       212 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3022                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.6248                                        avg =       4.0 
       overall = 0.4837                                        max =         4 
 
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =    437.92 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lgdppercap~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   ruleoflaw |   1.622535    .257857     6.29   0.000     1.117144    2.127925 
  lavertrade |  -.0008549   .0366775    -0.02   0.981    -.0727415    .0710317 
investment~p |   .3291961   .0285336    11.54   0.000     .2732712     .385121 
govconshar~p |   .1058485   .0417191     2.54   0.011     .0240807    .1876164 
       _cons |   65.90368   11.21311     5.88   0.000     43.92639    87.88097 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  128.00592 
     sigma_e |  91.331967 
         rho |  .66265566   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:   ruleoflaw 
Instruments:    lavertrade investmentgdp govconsharegdp frehouserating wardead revolution 
                cima_v 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 5 Panel Fixed effect IV regression  
 
Fixed-effects (within) IV regression         Number of obs      =          848 
Group variable: ctry                         Number of groups   =          212 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1198                      Obs per group: min =            4 
       between = 0.6100                                     avg =          4.0 
       overall = 0.4553                                     max =            4 
 
                                             Wald chi2(4)       =      3974.14 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2832                      Prob > chi2        =       0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lgdppercap~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   ruleoflaw |   1.579087   .2395886     6.59   0.000     1.109502    2.048672 
  lavertrade |   -.020254   .0432842    -0.47   0.640    -.1050896    .0645816 
investment~p |   .2575612   .0336336     7.66   0.000     .1916405    .3234819 
govconshar~p |   .0961099   .0425786     2.26   0.024     .0126573    .1795625 
       _cons |   84.53991   8.688616     9.73   0.000     67.51053    101.5693 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   111.5128 
     sigma_e |  91.331967 
         rho |  .59851397   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F  test that all u_i=0:     F(211,632) =     4.94         Prob > F    = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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